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Petri: Res Ipsa Loquitur - The Wyoming Supreme Court Relaxes the Element

RES IPSA LOQUITUR-The Wyoming Supreme Court Relaxes
the Elements a Plaintiff Needs to Establish Before
Invoking the Doctrine. Goedert v. Newcastle Equipment Co.,
802 P.2d 157 (Wyo. 1990).
In 1985, Nicholas Goedert was involved in a one-vehicle accident
when the brakes on the truck he was driving failed.1 Prior to the accident, Goedert had experienced difficulties with the truck's brakes and
had taken the truck to Newcastle Equipment Company in Newcastle,
Wyoming, to have the brakes repaired.2 An employee of Newcastle
Equipment Company worked on the brakes.3 Goedert then drove the
truck through Sundance, Wyoming, and over Warren Peak, to a location where the trailer he was pulling was loaded with wood.4 Goedert
had applied the brakes without incident during the approximately
thirteen-hour period since the work on the brakes had been done. 5
When Goedert first attempted to descend a grade with the load of
wood, the brakes failed to slow the truck.' To prevent the truck from
accelerating 7out of control, Goedert steered into an embankment and
was injured.
Goedert sued Newcastle Equipment Company alleging negligence
in the repair of the brakes.' The evidence at trial established that
Goedert was injured as a result of the brake failure. 9 Goedert was unable to establish with direct evidence either the cause of the brake failure or negligence on the part of Newcastle Equipment Company. 10 To
compensate for this lack of direct evidence, Goedert attempted to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Res ipsa loquitur would have
allowed Goedert to substitute an inference of negligence for direct evidence. 12 The jury would then have been permitted, but not compelled,
to infer Newcastle Equipment Company's negligence from the circumstances of the accident. 13 This permissive inference would have been
enough to prevent a directed verdict against Goedert."'

1. Appellant's Brief at 2-3, Goedert v. Newcastle Equip. Co., 802 P.2d 157 (Wyo.
1990) (No. 89-68) [hereinafter Appellant's Brief].
2. Goedert v. Newcastle Equip. Co., 802 P.2d 157, 158 (Wyo. 1990).
3. Id.
4. Appellee's Brief at 7, Goedert v. Newcastle Equip. Co., 802 P.2d 157 (Wyo.

1990) (No. 89-68) [hereinafter Appellee's Brief].
5. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 160.
6. Id. at 158.
7. Id.
8. Id.

9. Id.
10. Id. Goedert attempted to introduce expert testimony, but the trial court found
there was an insufficient basis for such testimony. Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 34.

11. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 158.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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The trial court ruled that res ipsa loquitur was not applicable to
the facts of the case because Newcastle Equipment Company did not
have "exclusive control" of the brakes when the injury occurred.' The
trial court then directed a verdict for Newcastle Equipment Company
at the close of Goedert's evidence."6 The Wyoming Supreme Court reversed and remanded on appeal. 7
The Wyoming Supreme Court found it reasonable to infer that
repair work has been done negligently when a mechanism fails shortly
after it has ostensibly been repaired.18 The court found that Goedert
had been improperly denied the benefit of res ipsa loquitur and that a
directed verdict for Newcastle Equipment Company was therefore
improper. 19
The Wyoming Supreme Court's decision in Goedert can be read
as having altered Wyoming's doctrine of res ipsa loquitur by modifying the elements that previously needed to be shown before a plaintiff
could invoke res ipsa loquitur.20 According to Justice Thomas, before
the decision in Goedert, Wyoming case law required a showing by the
plaintiff that the defendant controlled the injury-causing instrumentality before the plaintiff could invoke res ipsa loquitur. 2 ' In modifying the limitations on the applicability of res ipsa loquitur, the court
broadened the reach of the doctrine to cases where it previously did
not readily apply. 22 This casenote examines the Wyoming Supreme
Court's interpretation of the factors which limit the application of res
ipsa loquitur. Further, this casenote criticizes the court's decision allowing a plaintiff to successfully invoke res ipsa loquitur because the
defendant's knowledge about the true cause of the plaintiff's injury
was superior.
BACKGROUND

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has a long history of confused
and imprecise application. This Latin phrase literally means "the
thing itself speaks."2 Chief Baron Pollock in Byrne v. Boadle is usually credited with the first use of the phrase in the context of a negligence lawsuit.2 4 In this 1863 case, a barrel of flour fell from the win15. Id.
16. Id. at 157.
17. Id. at 161. On remand, the parties reached a settlement and the case was dismissed with prejudice, pursuant to Wyo. R. Cirv. P. 41. Stipulation of Dismissal with
Prejudice, Goedert v. Newcastle Equip. Co., No. 16367 (Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., Sept.
4,1991).
18. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 161.
19. Id. at 158.
20. Id. at 161 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 158 (majority).
24. Id. (citing Byrne v. Boadle, 159 Eng. Rep. 299 (1863)).
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dow of the defendant's building and hit the plaintiff on the shoulder. 25
The plaintiff was unable to show specifically the particular negligent
act that the defendant had committed.26 The defendant argued that
negligence can never be presumed from the mere occurrence of an accident and that the plaintiff could not prevail lacking affirmative
proof.2 7 Pollock disagreed, stating that courts in certain cases have
held the occurrence of an accident to be evidence of negligence.2" Pollock further stated that "[tlhere are certain cases of which it may be
said res ipsa loquitur, and this seems to be one of them. ' 2 The subsequent history of res ipsa loquitur has involved attempts to promulgate
criteria
that explain with more precision what those "certain cases"
30
are.
The doctrine quickly made its way across the Atlantic Ocean to
the United States. By 1905, res ipsa loquitur was so frequently invoked that Professor Wigmore included a discussion of it in his treatise on evidence. 3 1 Wigmore proposed three considerations to limit the
applicability of the rule:
(1) the apparatus must be such that in the ordinary instance no
injurious operation is to be expected unless from a careless construction, inspection, or user; (2) both inspection and user must
have been at the time of the injury in the control of the party
charged; (3) the injurious occurrence must have happened irrespective2 of any voluntary action at the time by the party
injured.
One commentator notes that most current expressions of the rule include elements similar to Wigmore's although the elements are some3
times phrased differently.5
Seven years after Wigmore first discussed res ipsa loquitur, the
United States Supreme Court applied the doctrine in San Juan Light
& Transit Co. v. Requena3 Justice Van Devanter, writing for the
Court, stated that res ipsa loquitur applies
[W]hen a thing which causes injury, without fault of the injured
person, is shown to be under the exclusive control of the defendant, and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of things does
25. Byrne, 159 Eng. Rep. at 299.
26. Id. at 300.
27. Id. at 301.
28. Id. at 300. The cases Pollock referred to were railroad accidents where two
trains owned by the same company collided on the same track. Id.
29. Id.
30. Goedert v. Newcastle Equip. Co., 802 P.2d 157, 159 (Wyo. 1990).
31. Id.
32. 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE,EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2509, at 3557 (1st

ed. 1905).

33. 1 STUART M. SPEISER,
(1972).
34. 224 U.S. 89 (1912).

THE NEGLIGENCE CASE, RES IPSA LOQUITUR
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not occur if the one having such control uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation, that
the injury arose from the defendant's want of care.15
Justice Van Devanter's phrase "exclusive control" would later find its
way into Wyoming's res ipsa loquitur rule. 6
In 1936, the Wyoming Supreme Court decided Stanolind Oil and
Gas Co. v. Bunce.3 7 Bunce was injured by an explosion as he attempted to relight a gas water heater. 8 The water heater was in an oil
field dormitory which Stanolind provided for its employees. 9 The
court examined various expressions of the rule and cases where it was
applied.40 Relying heavily on Wigmore and the United States Supreme Court's decision in San Juan, the court ruled res ipsa loquitur
41
inapplicable because the defendant was not in exclusive control

of

the water heater at the time of the explosion. 2 The court also found
that the explosion would not necessarily
have occurred irrespective of
3
any voluntary acts by the plaintiff.'
Justice Blume dissented in part, stating that as he interpreted
Wigmore's conditions, the defendant did control the water heater and
res ipsa loquitur could apply to the case." Justice Blume stated that
he was
[N]ot prepared to hold that a person injured by an apparatus,
which he used in the ordinary way with care and for the purpose
for which it was intended, cannot, in any case, have the benefit of
the rule, on the theory that such use leaves the defendant without
exclusive control of user[.] 45
When Wigmore revised his treatise, he referred to Stanolind as "the
leading case to date on the whole subject.'4 Wigmore also suggested
that Justice Blume's
qualification to the control element should re7
ceive acceptance.'

35. Id. at 98-99. Justice Van Devanter's language is adopted from 2 THOMAS M.
THE LAW OF TORTS, 1424 (John Lewis ed., 3d ed. 1906). Goedert, 802 P.2d at

COOLEY,

159.
36. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co. v. Bunce, 62 P.2d 1297 (Wyo. 1936).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 1299.
39. Id. at 1298.
40. Id. at 1301-07.
41. The requirement of "exclusive" control was apparently narrowly and literally
construed, as the court found a jury instruction to be erroneous when it used the phraseology "under the management and control of the defendant" instead of "under the
exclusive control of the defendant." Id. at 1307.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 1309 (Blume, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
45. Id.
46. 9 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALs AT COMMON LAW § 2509, n.2 (3d ed.
1940).
47. Id.
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In 1955, the Wyoming Supreme Court explicitly adopted Justice
Blume's more liberal interpretation of the control requirement.4 In
Rafferty v. Northern Utilities Company, the plaintiff's building had
been partially destroyed in a fire that was started by a gas heater."9
The defendant had recently repaired the heater and placed it into automatic operation.50 Even though the plaintiff owned the heater and
the heater was located in the plaintiffs building, the court ruled that
res ipsa loquitur applied, since the defendant had exclusive control of
the heater by virtue of Justice Blume's qualification in Stanolind.5 1
The court held that since the plaintiff had shown that no one had
tampered with the heater or interfered with its operation since the
defendant had repaired it, for the purpose of applying res ipsa loquitur, the defendant controlled it."2
The Wyoming Supreme Court has stressed the limited applicability of res ipsa loquitur5" and has also stated that res ipsa loquitur
cannot be properly invoked if the circumstances surrounding the injury do not suggest that the defendant's knowledge about the true
cause of the accident is superior." ' The court has hinted that an offer
of specific proof by the plaintiff may not negate the applicability of
res ipsa loquitur, but that at some point, where the plaintiff has made
out a prima facie case with the offered specific proof, application of
res ipsa loquitur is no longer either necessary or proper.55
Generally, courts in Wyoming and other jurisdictions continue to
apply the traditional three-element test to determine if res ipsa loquitur is applicable, but courts have modified the meanings of the elements. The Restatement (Second) of Torts has taken a slightly different approach to defining when res ipsa loquitur applies. The
Restatement recognizes the modifications of and exceptions to the
control element that most courts have made and provides:
(1) It may be inferred that harm suffered by the plaintiff is
caused by negligence of the defendant when
48. Rafferty v. Northwestern Util. Co., 278 P.2d 605, 612 (Wyo. 1955).
49. Id. at 606.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 612.
52. Id.
53. Wood v. Geis Trucking Co., 639 P.2d 903, 906-07 (Wyo. 1982). The court held
that res ipsa loquitur did not apply when there could be a reasonable inference that
"the injury or damage did not result from the negligence of the defendant, or where
the object causing [the] injury was not in the exclusive control of the defendant." Id.
The court in Wood seemed to require "exclusive control" even though the facts of the
case would have allowed a finding of constructive control as in Rafferty, decided some
twenty-two years earlier.
54. Hall v. Cody Gas Co., 477 P.2d 585, 586 (Wyo. 1970).
55. Langdon v. Baldwin-Lima-Hamilton Corp., 494 P.2d 537, 540 (Wyo. 1972).
The court has skirted this issue several times, and although it has discussed it at some
length on occasion, it has nonetheless never found it necessary to directly decide the
issue. See Western Fire Ins. Co. v. Tim Force Tin Shop, Inc., 599 P.2d 540, 548 n.7
(Wyo. 1979); Rafferty v. Northwestern Util. Co., 278 P.2d 605, 608-10, 12 (Wyo. 1955).
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(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in
the absence of negligence;
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the
plaintiff and third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. 6
The Restatement has no "control" element per se, but if the defendant had exclusive control at the time of the7 injury, the "other responsible causes" are inferentially eliminated.5
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been more frequently visited
by courts in other jurisdictions than it has been in Wyoming. 8 Courts
in other jurisdictions have addressed directly the finer points of the
doctrine, such as the exact procedural effect of res ipsa loquitur,"9 how
direct evidence changes applicability, 0 and whether the plaintiff can
have a directed verdict based solely upon a prima facie case made by
res ipsa loquitur6 1 In Wyoming, however, the Supreme Court has yet
to address many of these issues fully.
PRINCIPAL CASE

Goedert v. Newcastle Equipment Company presented the Wyoming Supreme Court with a case where the plaintiff tried to invoke
res ipsa loquitur when the defendant lacked "exclusive control" of the
injury-causing instrumentality at the time of the accident. Since the
trial court had directed a verdict for the defendant, the Wyoming Su62
preme Court first stated its standard of review for directed verdicts.
If the evidence would inescapably lead reasonable men to conclude
56. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1966).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. g (1966).

58. The volume of case law relating to res ipsa loquitur in other jurisdictions has
not necessarily clarified the doctrine. Justice Raper has stated, "[w]e are fortunate, for
our jurisprudence in this area consists of a series of soundly reasoned cases rather than
the cacophonous mass of decisions that make up the general body of law in this area."
Western Fire Ins. Co., 599 P.2d at 545.
59. E.g., Sweeney v. Erving, 228 U.S. 233 (1913) (holding res ipsa loquitur does
not shift the burden of proof); Johnson v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 125 So. 2d 537
(Miss. 1960) (holding res ipsa loquitur does shift the burden of proof).
60. E.g., Schneider v. United States, 188 F. Supp. 911 (E.D.N.Y. 1960) (holding
that pleading specific acts of negligence does not preclude application of res ipsa loquitur); Weston v. Gold & Co., 94 N.W.2d 380 (Neb. 1959) (holding that a petition alleging specific acts of negligence precludes application of res ipsa loquitur).
61. E.g., Richard Equip. Corp. v. Manhattan Indus. Contracting Co., 191 N.Y.S.2d
587 (1959) (granting a motion for summary judgment to a plaintiff who relied on res
ipsa loquitur).
62. Goedert v. Newcastle Equip. Co., 802 P.2d 157, 158 (Wyo. 1990). The court
applies the same standard as the trial court, giving no deference to the trial court's
decision. The evidence favoring the non-moving party is considered, and all reasonable
inferences are drawn therefrom. The evidence is not weighed, nor is the credibility of
the witnesses considered. Id.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol27/iss1/8

6

Petri: Res Ipsa Loquitur - The Wyoming Supreme Court Relaxes the Element
1992

CASENOTES

that the verdict must be against the non-moving party, then the directed verdict would stand.8
From the number of issues Goedert presented to the court on appeal, the court chose to focus on the propriety of the trial court's refusal to allow the use of res ipsa loquitur. 64 If Goedert had improperly
been denied the benefit of res ipsa loquitur, then the directed verdict
was erroneous. If res ipsa loquitur applied, a question of fact existed,
since the doctrine permits the trier of fact to infer the defendant's
negligence from circumstantial evidence. 5 The jury must determine
whether to infer negligence, and if so, how much weight to give the
inference.
After recapping the early development of res ipsa loquitur, the
court noted that the discussion in the first edition of Wigmore's treatise on evidence became one of the bases for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur in Wyoming.6" In the original context of Wigmore's discussion, the defendant owned or managed a normally harmless, powerful
machine which was capable of producing serious injuries if improperly
managed." In this context, the justice in shifting the burden of proof
was that the defendant was presumed to have access to the evidence
concerning the management and operation of the machine, while the
plaintiff did not. 8 The court found this assumption to be logical.6 9
The court pointed to Justice Blume's dissent in Stanolind, noting
that Justice Blume felt control was more important as an indication of
who was in the best position to explain the accident, as opposed to
being a strict prerequisite to the application of res ipsa loquitur.7" According to the court, the United States Supreme Court later interpreted Justice Van Devanter's "exclusive control" language simi63. Id.
64. Id. Two of the issues presented by Goedert concerned the trial court's refusal
to allow the introduction of expert testimony about the cause of the brake failure.
Appellant's Brief, supra note 1, at 5. Res ipsa loquitur might have been inapplicable if
Goedert's expert were able to establish the cause of the brake failure. Therefore, it
seems the court should have determined if the offers of proof by Goedert's expert were
improperly excluded by the trial judge. If the court found the expert testimony was
improperly excluded, but for some reason decided not to remand the case on that basis
alone, the court would then have had to determine what effect offers of proof have on
the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. See supra note 55. While the
court may have concluded the trial court was correct in disallowing the testimony,
which therefore had no bearing on the res ipsa loquitur question, the court claimed not
to have even considered Goedert's other issues. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 158.
65. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 158.
66. Id. at 159. Wigmore understood the doctrine to give rise to a presumption of
negligence on the defendant's part. The court pointed out that in Wyoming the rule
raises only a permissible inference. Id. at 159 n.1. If res ipsa loquitur gave rise to a
presumption of negligence, then the defendant would be required to present evidence
to rebut the presumption.
67. Id. at 159.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
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larly." The court stated that in Rafferty, it adopted the qualified
meaning of exclusive control as expressed by Justice Blume and approved by Wigmore. 72 In Rafferty, exclusive control did not refer to
actual physical control at the time of the injury, but instead its qualified nature was based on superior knowledge.1 3 The court had previously stated that "if the circumstances do not show or suggest that
defendant should have superior knowledge, or if the plaintiff himself
possesses equal or superior means of explaining the occurrence, the
rule may not properly be invoked." 4 Therefore, the court concluded
that conversely,7 5res ipsa loquitur is proper if the defendant has superior knowledge.
The court found the circumstances in Goedert to be similar to
those in Rafferty." In both cases, the defendants worked on the plaintiffs' machines, which appeared to work normally at first, but later
malfunctioned and injured the plaintiffs.7 7 In both cases, the defendants were in superior positions to explain what was done at the time
the repairs were made.7 8 In neither case was there evidence of any
interference with the
operations of the machines between the times of
79
repair and failure.
The court was not persuaded by Newcastle Equipment Company's argument that the successful application of the truck's brakes
during the thirteen hours that passed between the repairs and the accident precluded any inference that the brakes were negligently repaired.80 Recognizing that the potential for intervening factors increases as the time between repair and injury lengthens, the court was
nonetheless unwilling to hold that in this case, the inference of a
causal relationship was precluded. 8 ' The brakes did fail, the court
noted, the first time the plaintiff attempted to descend a grade with
the loaded truck.8 2

71. Id. at 160 (citing Jesionowski v. Boston & M.R.R., 329 U.S. 452, 456-57
(1947)). Jesionowski was a brakeman employed by the defendant's railroad and was
killed in a derailment. Jesionowski, 329 U.S. at 453. There were several possible causes
of the derailment, including improper switching and signaling, over which Jesionowski
had some control. Id. at 456. The Supreme Court stated that to hold that "res ipsa
loquitur cannot be applied even though those non-exclusively controlled factors are
clearly shown to have had no causal connection with the accident ...unduly narrows
the doctrine." Id. at 457.
72. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 160.
73. Id.
74. Id. (quoting Hall v. Cody Gas Co., 477 P.2d 586, 586 (Wyo. 1970)).
75. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 160.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id. The truck was not driven for the entire thirteen hour period. Goedert
claimed he was helping load the firewood onto the trailer for ten or eleven of the thirteen hours. Appellee's Brief, supra note 4, at 7.
81. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 160-61.
82. Id. at 160.
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The court found that res ipsa loquitur applied to Goedert's case."3
The inference that the defendant was negligent could be drawn from
the fact that the brakes failed shortly after repair.8 4 This inference,
favorable to the plaintiff, precluded a directed verdict for the defendant. The case was reversed and remanded."'
Justice Thomas dissented. He saw the majority's ruling as permitting the jury to presume negligence from the occurrence of the accident and invoke conjecture as the basis for liability.86 According to
Justice Thomas, this contravened a well established principle of Wyoming law.8 7 Justice Thomas also faulted the majority's reliance on
Rafferty."' The operative facts of Rafferty, wherein the machine was
placed in automatic operation within the plaintiff's building, clearly
limited the scope of the decision."' The plaintiffs in Rafferty and
Goedert were not similarly involved in the operation of the machines.
As Justice Thomas interpreted Justice Blume's dissent in Stanolind,
Justice Blume would have used a theory of strict liability to justify
the jury's reliance on res ipsa loquitur.9 0 Justice Thomas felt that
while that approach may have been visionary, it was neither the law,
nor did it fit the facts in Goedert.9 1 Restating Wigmore's limitations,
Justice Thomas noted that until the majority's decision in Goedert,
the control element had been maintained in the law of Wyoming. 2
Justice Thomas argued that the majority's reliance on the supe-

83. Id. at 161.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 161 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
87. Id. (citing DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986); Mellor v. Ten Sleep
Cattle Co., 550 P.2d 500 (Wyo. 1976); Apperson v. Kay, 546 P.2d 995 (Wyo. 1976);
Jivelekas v. City of Worland, 546 P.2d 419 (Wyo. 1976); Elite Cleaners & Tailors, Inc.
v. Gentry, 510 P.2d 784 (Wyo. 1973)). These cases all support the proposition that
"[n]egligence cannot be presumed from the mere happening of [an] accident." Mellor,
550 P.2d at 504.
88. Goedert, 802 P,2d at 161 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
89. Id.
90. Id. It would seem that Justice Blume's dissent in Stanolind is subject to
wildly varying interpretations. The majority in Goedert read Justice Blume's opinion
as supportive of its theory that control was more important as an indication of which
party posses superior knowledge, as opposed to being a prerequisite to application of
res ipsa loquitur. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 160. The court in Rafferty used Blume's Stanolind dissent, without elaboration, to find constructive control, "by virtue of the
qualifiaction [sic] of the control requirement as heretofore expressed by [Justice
Blume.]" Rafferty v. Northwestern Util. Co., 278 P.2d 605, 612 (Wyo. 1955). Justice
Thomas found Justice Blume's opinion to use a visionary theory of strict liability to
justify the jury's reliance on res ipsa loquitur. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 161 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). While exactly what Justice Thomas meant is not immediately clear from
either his opinion or Justice Blume's, Justice Thomas seemed to suggest that Justice
Blume had confused or combined negligence and strict liability theories. For a critical
analysis of another court's attempt to clarify some of these same issues, see, Note,
Exclusive Control Under Strict Liability and Res Ipsa Loquitur, 11 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 599 (1985).
91. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 161 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 161-62.
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rior knowledge justification for shifting the duty of producing evithe
dence had no bearing on a situation like that in Goedert, where
9
plaintiff was operating a machine not owned by the defendant. 3 Justice Thomas felt the plaintiff should bear the burden of establishing
his claim, and the control requirement should not be overlooked simply to shift the burden to the defendant." Justice Thomas also argued
that Goedert had equal if not superior access to evidence about the
cause of the accident.95 Justice Thomas would have affirmed the district court's directed verdict."
ANALYSIS

In Goedert, the Wyoming Supreme Court reached a result oriented decision to avoid leaving the plaintiff without a remedy.
Through misinterpretation of precedent, unsound inference and an
imperfect analogy, the court concluded that the inference of the defendant's negligence was warranted. While the result may have been
less harsh to the plaintiff, the resultant rule is too broadly applicable
and allows a jury to infer a defendant's negligence when such an inference is not justifiable.
Prior to the court's decision in Goedert, it was prerequisite to the
application of res ipsa loquitur that the plaintiff demonstrate that the
injury he suffered would not have occurred in the absence of negligence. " The plaintiff was also required to show that the negligence
that occasioned the injury was the defendant's and not his own.9 8
While the circumstances surrounding the accident may "speak for
themselves,"9 9 all the circumstances say is that someone was negligent.1"' More evidence is usually required to point the finger of blame
93. Id. at 162. It is unclear from the majority's opinion exactly why the defendant is presumed to have had superior knowledge about the accident.
94. Id.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97. Wood v. Geis Trucking Co., 639 P.2d 903, 906 (Wyo. 1982).
98. It was argued that with the adoption of the comparative negligence statute in
Wyoming, the plaintiff in a res ipsa loquitur case need not demonstrate a complete
absence of contributory negligence to avail himself of the doctrine. Glen E. Smith,
Comment, ComparativeNegligence in Wyoming, 8 LAND & WATER L. REV. 597, 625-26
(1973). Nonetheless, the Wyoming Supreme Court continued to hold that the doctrine
of res ipsa loquitur applied to situations where the damage occurred "without fault of
the plaintiff" even after the adoption of comparative negligence. Wood, 639 P.2d at
906.
99. There is some disagreement about whether it is the circumstances surrounding the accident, the accident itself or the instrumentality that "speaks for itself."
SPEI ER, supra note 33, § 1:3, at 10.
100. Common human experience is usually the basis for determining if in fact the
injury would not have occurred absent someone's negligence. In medical malpractice
lawsuits, attempts are often made to invoke res ipsa loquitur despite the fact that
common experiences and knowledge are sometimes an insufficient basis to determine if
the injury would have occurred in the absence of negligence. For an analysis of res ipsa
loquitur in Wyoming as it relates to medical malpractice, see Richard R. Wilking,
Note, Res Ipsa Loquitur in Medical Malpractice Actions in Wyoming, 12 LAND &
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at the defendant. 10 1
If the plaintiff was not negligent, and the defendant was literally
in the exclusive control of the injuring instrumentality, then with logical certainty, the defendant is the only one who could have been negligent.10 2 The element of exclusive control is intended to exclude the
possibility of causes other than the defendant's negligence.10 3 According to one commentator, most courts have recognized that a strict interpretation of the requirement of exclusive control is not always just,
and therefore, courts do not strictly apply the requirement."0
Often, although the defendant technically lacks exclusive control
at the precise instant of the injury, it is still almost certain that the
defendant was negligent. This is especially true if the cause of injury
is that the defendant has lost control of the injuring instrumentality.'05 The control element thus requires that the defendant had the
right to the exclusive control of the injuring instrumentality, or the
non-delegable duty to exercise such control. 0 6 Such a modification in
meaning does not corrupt the purpose of the control element.
The Wyoming Supreme Court has recognized that mechanical application of the exclusive control element is sometimes unjustifiable.10 7
The court has allowed res ipsa loquitur to be applied when the plaintiff has shown the defendant to have had "constructive control."' 06 In
Goedert, the defendant certainly did not literally have exclusive control.0 9 Rather, the plaintiff was in exclusive control of both the truck
and the truck's brakes for a reasonably long period after the defendant made the repairs."0 For res ipsa loquitur to be applicable in the
Goedert case, some meaning, other than the obvious, must be found in
the control element.
The court found that the control element was satisfied if the defendant had "superior knowledge" about the cause of the accident.
The court reasoned that, from Justice Blume's Stanolind dissent, it
was possible to equate control with superior knowledge. The court
stated that Justice Blume "argued that the 'control' element was more
important as a means of determining who was in the best position to
WATER L. REv. 757 (1977).
101. 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS, § 19.7, at 45 (2d ed. 1986).
102. Id.
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D cmt. g (1966).
104. HARPER, supra note 101, § 19.7, at 45.
105. For example, even in the classic res ipsa loquitur case of Byrne v. Boadle, 59
Eng. Rep. 299 (1863), the barrel of flour was in fact under the control of no one at the
time of the injury.
106. HARPER, supra note 101, § 19.7, at 47.
107. E.g., Rafferty v. Northwestern Util. Co., 278 P.2d 605 (Wyo. 1955).
108. Id. The Wyoming Supreme Court generally does not use the phrase "constructive control," but commentators describe the qualified nature of control that the
court has recognized as "constructive." E.g., SPEISER, supra note 33, § 2:13, at 61-62.
109. Goedert v. Newcastle Equip. Co., 802 P.2d 157, 157 (Wyo. 1990).
110. Id. at 160.
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explain the accident rather than as a strict prerequisite for the application of res ipsa loquitur."'
This would seem to be a questionable characterization of Justice
Blume's opinion. Justice Blume did not advocate disregarding exclusive control as a prerequisite to the application of res ipsa loquitur.
He did argue that the defendant in Stanolind still had control of the
injury-causing instrumentality, even though the plaintiff was operating it at the time of the accident." 2 Justice Blume's argument was
based on Wigmore's language" 3 that, the "user must have been at the
time of the injury in the control of the party charged."1"' Justice
Blume argued that the defendant had undertaken to supply hot water
with a gas water heater and was therefore the "user" of the water
As Justice Blume interpreted Wigmore's requirement, the
heater.'
fact that the plaintiff operated the heater did not deprive the defendant of exclusive control." 8 Justice Blume's only reference to superior
knowledge was his statement that when a person uses an apparatus as
intended, it "in no way shows that he is in [a] better position than, or
in as good a position as, the owners of the apparatus to explain the
accident.""' 7
Inherent in Justice Blume's statement is the belief that the defendant's superior knowledge about the true cause of the accident is a
justification for the entire doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The fact that
the defendant likely has access to information and evidence has been
seen by some commentators as the underlying rationale which justifies
allowing the inference of negligence and the possible imposition of liability on a defendant when the plaintiff cannot prove his case with
direct evidence."18
Usually, permitting an inference of negligence would be unjust. It
is less so if the defendant was in the exclusive control of the injuring
instrumentality and by that fact does presumably have superior
knowledge about its management. The presumption of the defendant's superior knowledge becomes weaker as the exclusivity of the de-

111. Id. The majority cited Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 62 P.2d 1297, 1309 (Wyo.
1937) (Blume, J., concurring and dissenting in part), to support this statement, but
probably meant to cite page 1310. See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
112. Stanolind, 62 P.2d at 1309 (Blume, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
113. Justice Blume was interpreting language from 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2509, at 3557 (1st ed. 1905).
114. Stanolind, 62 P.2d at 1309 (Blume, J., concurring and dissenting in part).
115. Id.
116. Id.

117. Id. at 1310.
118. SPEISER, supra note 33, § 2:26, at 83-84; 4 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN
TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2509, at 507 (Chadbourn rev. 1981); HARPER, supra note
101, § 19.9, at 62. Harper acknowledges the "notion" that the defendant's superior
access to the facts is an underlying foundation to the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, but he
argues that it should not be a "hard and fast" prerequisite to the application of res
ipsa loquitur. Id.
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fendant's control is diminished." 9 The defendant in Goedert did not
own the truck and exercised no control over the truck's brakes after
the truck left his shop. Therefore, the presumption that he had superior knowledge seems weak at best.
Some characterize the defendant's superior knowledge as being12 0a
separate element to the prima facie case made by res ipsa loquitur.
Indeed, the Wyoming Supreme Court has found res ipsa loquitur inapplicable to situations where the defendant did not possess superior
knowledge about the accident, even though the defendant had control."' Control and superior knowledge were distinct elements.
The court in Goedert uses the fact that the absence of the defendant's superior knowledge could operate to exclude application of
res ipsa loquitur and verbal sleight of hand to make its application of
the doctrine in Goedert seem more reasonable. The court quoted Justice McIntyre's statement in Hall v. Cody Gas Company that, "if the
circumstances do not show or suggest that defendant should have superior knowledge, or if the plaintiff himself possesses equal or superior
means of explaining the occurrence, the rule may not properly be invoked. ' 1

2

"Conversely," the court concludes, "res ipsa loquitur may

properly be invoked when circumstances do show or suggest that defendant has superior knowledge or means of explaining the occurrence." 3 This conclusion is the converse of the statement in Hall in
the loose sense that it is roughly the opposite. Such a conclusion disregards the fact that in Hall, the plaintiff would also have been required to show the other traditional elements of res ipsa loquitur. In
fact, the court's conclusion is logically invalid. 12 4 The true converse of
the quotation from Hall is, "If res ipsa loquitur may be properly invoked, then the defendant should have superior knowledge or means
of explaining the occurrence." This does not seem to help justify the
court's apparent elimination of the control element in Goedert.
Although the Wyoming Supreme Court does not state that it was
119. The defendant in Goedert heard nothing from the plaintiff until the complaint was filed nearly three years later. Appellee's Brief, supra note 4, at 6-7. Under
these circumstances it seems unlikely that Newcastle Equipment Company would have
better access to evidence, or superior knowledge about the true cause of the accident.
120. SPEISER, supra note 33, § 2:27, at 85-86. Harper is critical of the superior
knowledge requirement and suggests that the case law indicates courts do not adhere
to the requirement even when they claim to. HARPER, supra note 101, § 19:9, at 60.
121. See Hall v. Cody Gas Co., 477 P.2d 585 (Wyo. 1970).
122. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 160 (quoting Hall, 477 P.2d at 586).
123. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 160.
124. The fallacy of the court's reasoning may be more easily seen by considering
an argument that is identical in form to the one the court made. For example: "If Bob
is not sober, then Bob should not drive a car." This is true even if Bob is seven years
old or, for that matter, if Bob is a dog. The court's "converse" statement would be
structurally identical to, "If Bob is sober, then Bob should drive a car." This is clearly
not true if Bob is seven years old or if he is a dog. On the other hand, the actual
converse would be, "If Bob should drive a car, then Bob is sober." The actual converse
of the quote from Hall is given in the body of the text above.
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doing so, the court may actually have been trying to apply a Restatement approach. Under the Restatement, the plaintiff could invoke res
ipsa loquitur if the evidence substantially eliminated the other responsible causes except for the defendant's negligence. In Goedert,
nothing indicates that the plaintiff produced evidence to eliminate
sufficiently either his conduct or conduct of some third party as the
cause of his injury. It is unlikely that a plaintiff in active control of
the injuring apparatus could sufficiently eliminate his conduct as a
cause of his own injury.1 2 5 It is a well-settled rule in most jurisdictions
that a plaintiff in control of the injuring instrumentality cannot have
the benefit of res ipsa loquitur.'2 1
A permissible inference of negligence may be reasonable if all
other possible causes of the accident between the time of Newcastle
Equipment Company's control and Goedert's injury can be eliminated. 2 7 If no one else exercised control of the brakes in the time
between the repairs and injury, an inference of negligence on the repairman's part may again be warranted. 28 This was the case in Rafferty, where the court found the defendant to have constructive control at the time of the injury.
The court in Goedert relied heavily on Rafferty's similarity to
Goedert to justify the application of res ipsa loquitur in the latter. 129
However, as Justice Thomas pointed out, there is a glaring dissimilarity in the facts of the two cases. 3 ' In Rafferty, the repairman was the
last person to touch the heater before it exploded. While the plaintiff
potentially controlled the heater, he never exercised that control. In
Goedert, the plaintiff not only potentially controlled the truck's
brakes, but exercised the control actively for a reasonably long period
after repairs were effected.
The court in Goedert, in making the Rafferty/Goedert comparison, stated that in neither case was there evidence of tampering or
interference with the operation of the machines.'s' This is true, but it
is of little significance in furthering the inference that the defendant
was negligent. When plaintiffs have presented their evidence, a failure
to demonstrate their own tampering or interference with the machine
is meaningless. A plaintiff should be required to produce evidence
32
that demonstrates he did not interfere or tamper with the machine."
If this is done, the inference that the defendant was negligent is reasonable. In Rafferty, the plaintiff affirmatively and with uncontra125. SPEISER, supra note 33, § 2:19, at 68.

126. Id.

127. This is the approach taken by the Restatement (Second)
§ 328D(1)(b). RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1966).
128. SPEISER, supra note 33, § 2:13, at 62.
129. Goedert, 802 P.2d at 160.
130. Id. at 161 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. Id. at 160 (majority).
132. SPEISER, supra note 33, § 2:12, at 57.
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dicted evidence demonstrated that no one else touched the heater after the defendant made repairs. 8 3 Such was not the case in Goedert,
and therefore it seems there was no basis for an inference that the
defendant was negligent.
CONCLUSION

The Wyoming Supreme Court greatly reduced the difficulty of establishing a prima facie case with res ipsa loquitur. Satisfying the element of the defendant's control has been made unnecessary. Relaxing
the requirements for making a prima facie case by res ipsa loquitur is
usually dangerous since, lessening what the plaintiff must show, weakens the inference that the defendant was negligent. It also more frequently forces the defendant to bear the burden of proving his nonnegligence.'"
In Goedert, the court has blurred what was before a clearly defined rule of law in Wyoming. The court does not give a clear exposition of the res ipsa loquitur rule as it now stands. In the aftermath of
the Goedert decision, it would seem res ipsa loquitur can be invoked
by showing that the injury would not normally have occurred absent
negligence and little else. The plaintiff does not need to establish control or even constructive control, but only that the defendant had superior knowledge about the unspecified negligent act of which he is
accused. The court does not explain how the plaintiff in Goedert
showed that the defendant had superior knowledge. In fact, the court
failed to explain exactly what "superior knowledge" means. Whatever
it means, the court seems to have presumed that the defendant had it.
The plaintiff can also apparently demonstrate his injury was not
caused by his own actions, or those of a third party, by not introducing evidence to the contrary. In almost any case where there is even a
suspicion that the defendant may have committed some negligent act
which injured the plaintiff, res ipsa loquitur would seem to be available to the plaintiff. In Wyoming, the doctrine is no longer one of necessity, but instead seems it is one of broad applicability. In the
American judicial context, such an expansive doctrine is unwarranted,
unfair to defendants, and there is an undeniably real potential for
abuse.
JASON

_ PETRI

133. Rafferty v. Northwestern Util. Co., 278 P.2d 605, 613 (Wyo. 1955).
134. The defendant is perfectly able to just let the case go to the jury after the
plaintiff successfully utilizes res ipsa loquitur, since only a permissible inference of
negligence is raised. The jury is not required to conclude the defendant was negligent,
but as a practical matter, they almost always do and the defendant is foolish not to
put on a defense, if intending to let the jury decide the case. HARPER, supra note 101,
§ 19.11, at 69-70, 74.
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